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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter individuals constitute the unit of analysis. Individuals must be 
considered because innovation is not simply a product of firms and 
organizations, it requires individual creativity. A century ago Schumpeter 
clearly identified the individual entrepreneur as essential to technological 
development. We follow this Schumpeterian notion that innovation, a form of 
creativity very much like entrepreneurial activity, is fundamentally individual in 
its genesis. Firms and organizations can create conditions that enhance or 
detract from the innovative activity of individuals, but it is the individuals who 
innovate. Yet we also know that not all individuals innovate (or invent) equally. 
Among individuals, even among individual entrepreneurs or firm innovators, 
innovation is not uniformly distributed. This heterogeneity among individuals 
is, of course, not unrelated to the existence of technological gaps across firms 
and organisations as far as innovation activities are concerned. This variation 
across firms is especially important in evolutionary economics and was 
recognized explicitly by Alfred Marshall. It a natural outcome in a world 
marked by competition where organizations have heterogeneous bases of 
competences, different sets of strategies and, as a consequence, perform 
differently(c.f., Metcalfe, 1995). In other words, we are in Antonelli’s world of 
“organized complexity” as he describes it in the Introduction to this book. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates heterogeneity among inventors using the distribution of U.S. 
patents for the most productive French inventors (those with 15 or more 
inventions) over the period from1975 to 2002. The distribution is characterized 
by heterogeneity and skewness.
2 The distributions for the other countries that 
we have examined , as expected, appear to be quite similar  The most noticeable 
                                                   
1 The authors thank L'Agence nationale de la recherche, Paris for funding our research on prolific inventors 
regarding the characteristics, the productivity distributions, and the time paths of the careers of prolific inventors 
in the five largest countries in terms of overall technological activity (See Le Bas et al., (2009) and Latham et 
al., (2009). Christian Le Bas acknowledges the funding and support of the International Center for Economic 
Research, Torino where he was a Fellow in 2008 and 2009.  We also thank Riad BoukliaHassan,  Naciba 
Haniba and Dmitry Volodin for their valuable  research assistance. 
2 The distribution shown is truncated because our data set has no information before 1975 or after 2002 and thus 
we do not have completed information for inventors who were at mid-career at the beginning and the end of our 
data. However, we have also examined the distribution for inventors whose entire careers begin and end within 
the data and know that the truncation does not affect the fundamental characteristics of the distribution.    2 
and significant characteristic of these "long-tailed" distributions is that  high-
frequency or high-amplitude populations are followed by low-frequency or low-
amplitude populations whose frequencies or amplitudes "tail off" asymptotically 
to zero.  





This chapter provides an understanding of the causes and the consequences of 
the particular shapes of the distributions of individual inventors' productivities 
that have been observed. It has long been acknowledged that technological 
activities are characterized by asymmetrical distributions. The basic question 
underlying this paper is this: What can we learn about individual innovation 
from the analysis of similar phenomena observed in scientific productivity?  In 
Section 2 we review a literature that begins with Lotka's (1926) "law" regarding 
his observations about the persistence of diversity in scientific productivity at 
any point in time and also over time. We note that Lotka's model has been 
extended to technological activities and has proved useful for describing and 
understanding  inventor p roductivity distributions.  In S ection 3 we survey   3 
empirical work regarding the utility of the "power law" and the Pareto 
distribution to describe and explain empirically observed distributions. Section 
4 is devoted to the economics of "prolificness." Here we are especially 
interested in the highly productive, or more “prolific,” inventors from the upper 
parts of the frequency distributions for inventors. While the identifying 
characteristic of a prolific inventor is that he individually contributes to the 
production of more than the average number of patents (which can be termed 
“quantity” productivity), we hypothesize that prolific inventors also contribute 
to the production of patents having greater than the average values (which can 
be termed “value” productivity). Our focus on "prolificness" allows us to 
explore the processes underlying k nowledge accumulation at the individual 
level including its features, characteristics, and structural trends. We show that 
“prolificness” is a dual process: First, we show, as has been shown in numerous 
empirical studies, that some inventors are able to reach the upper end of the 
“quantity” productivity distribution by accumulating much larger than the 
average numbers of patents. Second we explore the specific processes by which 
these individuals create, maintain, and increase knowledge accumulation as 
their careers evolve. 
2.   "LOTKA" WORLD: A COMPLEX SYSTEM OF CREATIVITY 
 
The Lotka world simply generalizes to more activities the highly skewed 
distribution of productivity among scientists first identified by Lotka (1926). 
The first work to extend the "Lotka model" to the productivity of inventors was 
Narin and Breitzman’s (1995) paper on prolific inventors. They found a "Lotka-
like distribution" in the semi-conductor sector, and suggested that the same type 
of "law" governs the productivity distribution for the creation of new ideas in 
science and in technology
3. 
2.1. Empirical issues related to the Lotka model 
2.1.1. Introduction to the issues 
Among the well-known examples of skewed distributions of human creative 
activity that we will describe are the following: (1) the small proportion of 
individuals who ever patent an invention, (2) the extremely highly concentrated 
nature of eminence in science as described by Dereck Solla Price (1965), (3) 
the fact that only a small fraction of patents receives most citations while most 
patents receive few citations, (4) and the same citations pattern is observed for 
academic publications as for patent citations. All of these frequency 
distributions - of patents per inventor, publications per academic, citations per 
patent, and citations per academic publication, as well as many others - are not 
                                                   
3 See also Göktepe (2007).   4 
symmetric but highly skewed. We refer to them as "complex" distributions 
because the observed varieties in individual creative capacity are the product of 
complex forces involving individuals, firms, organizations, and external effects 
across space and time. We contrast these skewed distributions with the 
assumption of normal (Gauss-Laplace) distributions for the characteristics and 
behaviours of the agents implicit in much of standard neo-classical economics. 
In the latter framework, the law of large numbers applies, and thus the mean is 
often a suitable representation for an entire distribution. By contrast, in 
complex technological-economic systems we show that understanding the 
nature of long-tail distributions, those that are highly right-skewed (such as the 
Pareto, log-normal, and others) is crucial. The "long-tailed" distributions 
describe a kind of diversity in their asymmetric shapes: a high-frequency 
population is followed by a low-frequency population which "tails off" 
asymptotically to zero.  
Since Lotka’s seminal work on the subject many additional woks in different 
disciplines and over varied time periods have confirmed this long- tailed form 
for the distribution of creativity.  It has been shown that the distribution is even 
more skewed when the scientific productivity is measured by patent citations. 
For us the significant feature of the Lotka world is simply the highly-skewed 
distribution of productivity among scientists and inventors.  
2.1.2. Detailed explanation of the Lotka Law.  
Lotka's law of scientific productivity states that the number of scientists yx each 
having produced x number of papers, is inversely proportional to x, which is 
the output of each individual author. The relation may be expressed as: 
x
n yx = C 
where n and C are two constants that can be estimated with data on the numbers 
of scientific publications by author. Lotka's own calculations gave values to C 
of 0.61 and 0.57  for  n = 2 and n  =1.888, respectively.  Thus in Lotka’s 
distribution 6% of scientist publishers produce half of the papers (Stephan, 
1996). Some authors claim that a generalised form of Lotka's law is the “inverse 
power law” discussed in the next section below (Bookstein, 1976). Since the 
publication of Lotka's paper many studies have tested the existence of Lotka's 
law on particular samples. There have been too many studies for us to report on 
the results of each one in this chapter. For our purposes it is sufficient to note 
that some of these works have shown that Lotka's law does not apply to specific 
data sets. Nevertheless the nature of the distributions found remain the same: all 
are very skewed to the right with a long tail.  
   5 
We note that the research program on Lotka’s distribution is not really 
complete. We find in the recent literature a large number of papers that continue 
to deal with it
4. Efforts to explain why Lotka’s Law “works” to the extent that it 
does  constitute another branch of research relative to the Law. For instance 
Huber (2002) develops a new model for a process that generates Lotka's Law. 
He shows that four relatively mild assumptions create a process that fits five 
different  “informetric” distributions: rate of production, career duration, 
randomness, and Poisson distribution over time, as well as Lotka's Law. By 
simulation, he obtains good fits to three empirical samples that exhibit the 
extreme ranges of the observed parameters. The overall error is 7% or less. An 
advantage of this model is that the parameters can be linked to observable 
human factors. The model is not merely descriptive, but also provides insights 
into the causes of differences between samples. Furthermore, the differences 
can be tested with powerful statistical tools
5. 
 
2.1.3. Explanatory frameworks 
 
We contrast two older proposed explanations or “frames of thinking about” the 
observed asymmetric distributions of innovative productivity:  (1) the "sacred 
star" and (2)  the "cumulative advantage" hypotheses of Allison and Stewart 
(1974). These two remain the most acknowledged explanatory frames. We 
discuss the supporting evidence for each hypothesis including empirical 
findings. 
 
The first, the "sacred star," refers to the hypothesis that differences in creative 
productivities of scientists are largely determined before theirs careers even 
begin. For instance the productive capacity might be linked to the formation of 
the scientist, to his/her motivation and to general ability.  Many academics are 
reluctant to consider this hypothesis because, in general, measures of 
intellectual ability have low correlations with creative productivity. David 
(1994) has identified another limit of this first approach: if a pre-determined 
distribution of abilities can perhaps explain the static cross-sectional distribution 
of productivity, it does not explain why the dispersion of productivity appears to 
increase over the life of cohorts of scientists. 
The second explanation for asymmetry, "cumulative advantage,” is much better 
known. It has been proposed as an explanation by Allison and Stewart:  
                                                   
4 Two illustrative papers showing the kind of interest in the topic that is on-going are: Kretschmer and . 
Kretschmer (2007) and Morris and Goldstein (2007) . See Egghe (2005) as well. 
5 Note that the Lotka’s analysis does not deal with the “value” of publications (which has been measured with 
citations).   6 
“First, scientists who have been recognized as having significant advances will 
be motivated by additional publications, and will be influenced by their 
colleagues’ expectations that they repeat or exceed those achievements. 
Second beyond these direct effects, recognition usually implies increased 
access to resources which facilitates research, …..” (Allison and Stewart, 
1974, p 597).  
So they conclude that cumulative advantage is the relevant explanation for the 
increase in productivity inequality. Cole and Cole (1973) have assembled some 
positive evidence in favour of this approach. Moreover they note that the 
cumulative advantages thesis is strongest where individuals are rewarded 
according to their merits (in this case, the “Matthew effect” (the phenomenon 
where "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer") is particularly important)
6. 
One point remains obscure and consequently would deserve more attention: is 
this cumulative advantage approach compatible with the pre-existing 
differences approach (which is the foundation of the “sacred stars” hypothesis?  
Surely, “yes” in theory, but perhaps it is less so in practice. All these issues are 
discussed in detail by Allison and Stewart (1974) and Cole and Cole (1973). 
Turner (2003) explicitly considers three laws of scientist productivity: 1) uneven 
distribution of productivity, 2)  persistence of the hierarchy, and 3) 
reinforcement of the productivity gap (Turner, 2003)
7.  
 
Strangely, there are only a few studies that provide empirical support for either 
of the two theses.
8 On the one hand Allison and Stewart (1974) confirmed the 
relevance of “accumulative advantages.” They show, with cross-sectional data 
for chemists, physicists and mathematicians, that the distribution of productivity 
becomes increasingly unequal as a cohort ages. Resources and esteem increase 
too as career age increases. Levin and Stephan (1991) analyzed scientist 
productivity in terms of career  life-cycle (see also Stephan, 1996).  After 
controlling for motivation and ability, they show that, in general, life-cycle has 
effects on productivity. As a consequence, this approach confirms and expands 
the Allison and Stewart (1974).   But, by contrast and much more recently, 
empirical work by Mairesse and Turner (2002) gives different results. They 
have a data set on physicists from the French CNRS. They do not confirm that 
the thesis of “accumulative advantages” applies.  
 
Six issues need to be considered in discussing the two approaches: 
                                                   
6 Cumulative advantage is a general mechanism for inequality across any temporal process in which a favorable 
relative position becomes a resource that produces further relative gains. DiPrete and Eirich (2006)  show that 
the concept of cumulative advantage has developed multiple meanings in the sociological literature, in particular 
in the areas of education, careers, and related life course processes. It is a well known in economics, explaining, 
for example, the productivity gap between individuals (inventors), firms, regions, and nations. 
7 Recently this approach has been challenged by Harhoff and Hoisl (2006). They note that pre-existing 
differences and cumulative advantages affect differences in output not in quality. 
8 Some of them are reviewed by David (1994).   7 
(1)  The "accumulative advantages" hypothesis is sometimes 
considered as a generalization of the Matthew effect, built on two 
feedback loops through recognition and resources. Although a variety 
of factors are at work in the process, the “winner-take all” 
manifestation in the reward structure in s cience translates small 
differences in human capital endowments into large differences in the 
economic reward (Stephan, 1996).  
 
(2)  An important  contribution is  the idea that the two theses 
(“sacred star” and “accumulative advantages”) might be two special 
cases of a more general approach based on heterogeneity and 
stochastic reinforcement models (mathematical formulations of which 
were proposed by Simon, 1957).  By contrast David (1994) has shown 
how  Polya Urn schemes  (processes first identified by Polya in 
probability theory in which a winning draw is reinforced) can be used 
for analysis of  the  cumulative advantages process, an  idea f irst 
suggested by Price (1965). 
 
 
(3)  Interestingly, with both these approaches we are entering into 
the working of complex systems. The heterogeneity hypothesis tells us 
that individuals perform  tasks  differently (for instance inventive 
productivities differ). The  reinforcing process delineates how the 
propensity to perform changes o ver time  and,  especially how, 
according to the “accumulative advantages” thesis, small differences 
may become large. 
 
(4)  It may be that the studies reviewed here do not sufficiently 
account for the characteristics of the modern process of invention in 
science and in technology: the production of new ideas is done by 
teams.  Some studies have  tested  Lotka's law with  institutional 
productivity data, where the institutions are viewed as  teams. In 
general negative binomial distributions fit these data better than 
Lotka's distribution
9. Of course this type of research opens the way to 
bibliometric studies and the ranking of institutions. These works are 
different from  Shockley (1957) who  analyzed the distribution of 
publications among scientists in a particular institution and found 
them to be distributed in a lognormal way. From this point of view the 
work by Mairesse and Turner (2002) fills a gap. They include in their 
models variables measuring the influence of research teams. The size 
of the team, its productivity and the quality of publications of the team 
                                                   
9 Nearly identical results are obtained from the analysis of the productivity of industrial firms in terms of 
patents.   8 
are found to be positively related (although the size of the team only 
has a weak impact on the other variables). We note with the that team 
interactions takes place within “local or global networks”, in small 
worlds, where  scientists are mobile and   collaboration between 
individuals is common  (Fleming and Marx, 2006). This last 
behaviour, collaboration, is more  prevalent for inventors than for 
scientists. 
 
(5)  Often the productivity of scientists is defined equivalently by 
either the quantity of publications or by their quality (as measured by 
the number citations they receive).  We believe it is necessary to 
distinguish explicitly between the quantity of publications and their 




(6)  An intriguing question is posed by the empirical literature: does 
the same law  that describes  scientists’ productivity  also apply to 
inventors “in technology” as well. In others words are scientists and 
inventors in the same Lotka world? After Lotka himself the works by 
Shockley (1957), Price (1976) and Seglen (1992) tend to confirm the 
main findings of the seminal Lotka study. But all these studies have 
been confined to the creative productivity of scientists. To our 
knowledge the first work that tries to extend the “Lotka world” to the 
productivity of inventors is Narin and Breitzman (1995) who focused 
on prolific inventors. They found that in the semi-conductor sector a 
“Lotka-like distribution” of the number of patents per inventor: a 
relative small number of highly productive inventors and a large 
number of inventors having only one patent. In brief they suggest that 
the same type of “law” governs the productivity distribution in the 
activity of creation of new ideas in science and in technology.
11  
 
2.2. A competitive explanation of  the  distribution of creativity: an 
evolutionary model of breakthrough inventions. 
 
Fleming and Szigety (2006) provided a fascinating model  that enables us  to 
understand the creation process at the core of Lotka’s law but which is general 
enough to be applied to contexts other than scientific discovery.   
They start their study with a psychological model first elaborated by Simonton 
(1999). Inventors generate new ideas through combinatorial thought trials 
subject to psychological and social selection processes (see also Fleming, 2007). 
                                                   
10 Mairesse and Turner (2002) show that the trend between the two indicators might be divergent. 
11 See also Göktepe (2007).   9 
They note that individuals who simultaneously juxtapose, combine,  and 
evaluate a stream of uncombined inputs will be more creative. The generative 
creativity is an assemblage or rearrangement of new combinations. The more 
the inventor tries recombinant actions the more he/she increases the likelihood 
of a productive hit. As a consequence we hypothesize a correlation between an 
inventor’s total output and the likelihood that he/she finds inventions with high 
impact (“a one-hit wonder is very unlikely” Fleming and Szigety, 2006: 340). 
“The most prolific inventor is the one most likely to invent a breakthrough” 
(ibid.: 340).
12  A scientist who has produced very highly cited publications has 
probably also published a lot of papers that are poorly cited, as Simonton (1999) 
noted. If we rank scientists (inventors) according to their productivity in terms 
of total number of papers (patents) we will find the “genius creators” with the 
most influential ideas  are  in the extreme  right tail of the distribution of 
productivity.  
Simonton (1999) has framed creativity as an investigation of the distributional 
moments of inventive output. He noted that the ratio of the number of major 
works to the number of minor works remained constant over a productive 
career. Fleming and Szigety (2006) make an inventory of the factors 
(technological and social-psychological variables) that have an influence on 
“the second moment of the creative outcome distribution” and consequently 
also affect  the propensity to create breakthroughs. For  example, among the 
important variables that have an expected positive impact on the variance of the 
distribution  are: diversity o f collaborators,  dissolution of collaborative 
relationship,  and  changes of creative fields: as has been noted by many 
researchers an inventor cannot invent alone, he/she invents collectively and 
within an “ecological context.”
13 As a consequence there are o rganizational 
influences on the evolution of the distribution of inventive behavior as well. In 
another paper Fleming (2007) finds empirical results in favour of his thesis. 
However, Mairesse and Turner (2002) find evidence contesting the trend for 
scientists ( they investigate French physicists). They find that at some point in 
time there seems to be a substitution between the quantity of publications and 
their quality. That is not in accordance with the law pictured by Fleming and 
Szigety (2006).
14 
                                                   
12 This point is controversial. Recent work on the private value of patents confirms the existence of a significant 
relationship between inventor productivity and value of inventions. The characteristics of the inventor, in 
particular his past number of patents, is the main determinant of this value, even more important than the 
characteristics of the organization in which he is employed (Gambardella et al., 2006). 
13 It appears that for Fleming and Szigety the same mechanisms of creativity apply both in science and in 
technology. 
14 Analysis of  “stars scientists” such as those in Zucker, Darby and Torero (2002) is relevant in this context. 
“Stars scientists” have  high-quality intellectual capital (measured in terms of number of citations) and make 
major discoveries (Zucker and Darby, 1996, 2001). The stars are also in the extreme  upper tail of the 
productivity distribution. The observation that, in the biotechnology sector, “the labour of the most productive   10 
 
We have reviewed theoretical and empirical analyses reported in the literature 
relating to scientists’ productivity distributions. These analyses led us into the 
workings of complex systems. The heterogeneity hypothesis tells us that 
individuals perform tasks differently; for example, inventive productivities 
differ.  The  Reinforcing processes hypothesis  provides the dynamics in the 
system, delineating how the propensity to perform changes over time and how, 
according to the "accumulative advantages" hypothesis, small differences may 
become larger.  
 
3. THE "LONG TAIL" STORY: THE P OWER LAW AND  THE 
PARETO DISTRIBUTION IN TECHNO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
 
The “long tail” is the name for a long-known feature of some statistical highly 
right-skewed distributions. The feature is also known as "heavy tails", "power-
law tails", or "Pareto tails.”  The main characteristic of "long-tailed" 
distributions is that a high-frequency or high-amplitude population is followed 
by a low-frequency or low-amplitude population which gradually "tails off" 
asymptotically. Some authors have also noted that this long tail is also bigger 
(higher). The events at the far  right  end of the tail have extremely low 
probabilities of occurrence but these probabilities are nonzero, as emphasized 
by Taleb (2007).  This type of distribution often follows a power law 
qualitatively quite different from the "normal" or "Gaussian" type distributions 
(which are narrower, symmetric and peaked) used to describe phenomena such 




For a distribution having the power law general form, the power law can be 
expressed as  
 
(1)  p(x) = C. x 
a,  
where  a is the exponent and the constant C =  e
c. In the case of a 
cumulative distribution, the exponent of the power law will be (1 – a).  
 
To check if an empirical distribution fits a power law, we can simply plot the 
data on a log-log scale. A power law distribution appears as a straight line. 
(Because loge [p(x)] =  c + a * loge (x) is a straight line.) Equivalently we can 
plot the cumulative distribution and it will give a straight line as well. We will 
                                                                                                                                                            
scientists is the main resource around which firms are built or transformed” can be generalized to high-tech 
industries. ( Zucker and Darby, 2006). 
15 See  Newman's (2006) survey.   11 
utilize these characteristics of power laws to represent the distribution of 
numbers of patents by inventors.  
 
3.1. Variety in highly right-skewed distributions: some definitions 
Newman (2006) uses the distribution of the population of all U.S.  cities to 
illustrate the power law. The right-skewed form of the distribution indicates that 
most U.S. cities have small populations while there are a small number of very 
large cities. Price (1965)  finds that  the numbers of citations received by 
scientific papers can be described as a power law distribution.  
Many skewed distributions are well-known.  They include power law 
cumulative distributions that are sometimes called "Pareto distributions," a type 
of continuous power law distribution first identified by Pareto (also known as 
the "80-20" distribution because 80% of the total density is accounted for by 
20% of the range of values). Pareto observed that 80% of Italy's wealth was 
owned by 20% of the population. He then carried out surveys on a variety of 
other countries and found that a similar distribution applied. The 80-20 Pareto 
principle states that, for many events, 80% of the effects come from 20% of the 
causes. It has many applications beyond world of  economics, especially in 
engineering and business management. An advantage of the Pareto power law is 
that the exponent a offers a measure of the concentration. There is a direct (and 
clear) relationship between it and the Lorenz concentration index (Bouget and 
Viénot, 1995).  
It is important not  to confuse the general phenomenon of the long tail, the 
power law that provides the general mathematical structure for the long tail, and 
the Pareto distribution as a particular (and popular) type of  power law 
distribution. 
Zipf's law leads to one of a family of related discrete power-law probability 
distributions first proposed by Zipf (1935, 1949).  If we rank a collection of 
individuals each having the rank r, by the size of the individual z r, the following 
relationship defines Zipf's law: 
(2)  r 
ß. z r = a constant, C,  where ß is Zipf’s parameter 
For the distribution of people by their wealth, we can rank the people beginning 
with the wealthiest person (rank = 1). The individual with the wealth, w r , has 
the rank r. In this context the function shows how wr is a power-law function of 
r (see, for  example,  Klass et al., 2007)
16. Such power-law cumulative 
distributions are also call rank/frequency distribution (see Newman, 2006). For 
relevant applications in the field of economic phenomena see Axtell (2001) and 
Naldi (2003). 
                                                   
16 Zipf's law refers to frequency distributions of "rank data," in which the relative frequency of the nth-ranked 
item is given by the Zeta distribution that is the discrete form of the probabilistic Pareto law.   12 
 
Note that, for small values of the variable being measured (i.e., for values of x < 
x  m),  a  distribution  often may  not follow a power law.
17 Consequently 
estimating the value of the coefficient a only for the values of x > x m requires 
making a judgment about the value of x m.  
Also note that a large number of highly right-skewed distributions do not follow 
power laws (Newman, 2006). There are other types of laws that can generate 
highly skewed distributions. Surprisingly, the second most popular distribution 
after Pareto’s law is not a general power-law distribution but is the so-called 
“Gibrat law”, the log-normal law,
18 that describes the distribution of firms by 
size in particular industries.  However,  recent studies  have shown that the 
parameters for Gibrat’s law in this situation are not stable (Sutton, 1997).
19 In 
addition, it’s value as a descriptive device has been challenged by other laws.
20 
Pareto’s distribution and the log-normal law yield very similar distributions. In 
some cases it is impossible to choose between the two (Petruszewycz , 1972). It 
is acknowledged that the foundations in terms of probability are clear 
concerning the log-normal law and somewhat fuzzy for Pareto’s distribution 
(Bouget and Viénot, 1995).  
 
3.2. The distribution of prolific inventors according their patents 
We propose to illustrate these different types of distributions using data 
collected by Le Bas et al. (2009) and Latham et al. (2009) on the distribution of 
inventor productivity in terms of inventions patented. 
For defining who is prolific inventor we decided to use the threshold of 15 U.S.  
patents granted over the time period under observation (1975-2002). We have 
examined the distributions for alternative numbers of patents. There is no large 
gap between the numbers of inventors having 13 or 14 patents and the (prolific) 
inventors having 15 or 16 patents. In others words, if we had fixed the threshold 
at 13 or 14 patents, the number of prolific inventors would have been larger, but 
this increase would not have been dramatic. We justify choosing 15 patents as 
our  threshold for identifying prolific inventors as follows: Trajtenberg (2004), 
in his report on inventors in the U.S. patenting system, notes that in the period 
1975-1999 the average number of patents per inventor was 2.74 ( for  all 
countries). Our period of observation is longer extending through 2002. We 
know that patenting strongly increased  toward  the end of the period u nder 
consideration. Thus we might expect that the average number of patents per 
inventor would have risen to about 3.00. It seems to us that a prolific inventor 
                                                   
17 Reed (2001) proposes a model that predicts there is a power law fitting the lower tail as well. 
18 We already have noted it is closed the Pareto distribution. 
19 Simon and Bonini (1958) show under some general conditions that this distribution might be a power law.  
20 See in particular Dosi et al., (2007).   13 
would be an individual with productivity (in terms of patents) at least five times 
higher than the average.
21 We use data for U.S patents issued to more than 
55,000 individual  prolific  inventors from five countries in our analysis. The 
countries are those with the largest numbers of patents in the US. Patent system: 
the U.S., Japan, Germany, France and the U.K. 
We have calculated the distribution of this population  of prolific inventors 
according to their individual levels of patenting. Figure  2 displays the 
relationship between the log of the number of patents per inventor (recall that 
the patenting begins at 15) and the log of cumulative decreasing frequency of 
individuals with the number of patents for France. For a large section of the 
observed distribution of points, a linear relationship fits well. As noted by many 
authors the right hand end of  the distribution is noisy because of the sample 
size. So we are in the frame of a power law distribution. We could have used 
simple OLS regressions to calculate slope parameters for the linear functions for 
each of the five countries. However, Newman (2006) showed that this method 
of estimation is biased. Fortunately he derived an alternative way of estimating 
these slope  coefficients. Using Newman’s method, we estimate the slopes as 
follows: Japan 1.5, Germany 1.4, U.S. 1.34, France 1.52, and U.K. 1.74.
22 The 
larger is the value of the coefficient, the steeper the slope and the smaller is the 
skewness. The U.S. has the distribution that is the most skewed, and the U.K.’s 
is the least skewed. Surprisingly the U.S. has a much larger number of prolific 
inventors than the U.K. It may be the size of the sample (which is much larger 
for the U.S.) influences the results but more studies will be necessary to get the 
right explanation.  Note that we could also perform this same analysis using the 
number of patents by technological fields or we could do it after pooling the 
data across all five countries.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
                                                   
21 Another option would have been to retain the top 1% or top 5% of patenting inventors. Tratjenberg (2004) 
observes that inventors present in 10 patents and more represent the top 5% of the inventor population. We thus 
estimate that with our threshold of 15 patents we focus on the 3% top inventors (in the U.S. patent system) and 
thus our figures can be compared with those cited in debates about top or star scientists. 
22 The ranking of countries as far as this estimator is concerned is virtually identical to those obtained with the 
OLS estimates and the actual values of the estimated  slopes are also very similar.   14 
 
 
3. 3. The quest for explanation: the frameworks
23 
We hypothesize that an empirical distribution fitting a power-law is stable (that 
the exponent a is constant when we calculate it for different time periods or 
different economic entities). This stability means mechanisms exist working for 
maintaining the stability of distributions.  
Many theoretical frameworks have been proposed to explain why stable power-
law distributions arise in the natural and social worlds. From the point of view 
of mathematical structures, a combination of exponentials can be sufficient for 
producing power-law distributions. Regarding the basic mechanisms,  some 
researchers have turned to the tools of “complex systems”  such as  “self-
organised criticality” or “highly-optimized tolerance.”  Other  researchers 
hypothesize that the well-known Yule process
24 can be applied to economic 
phenomena such as the growth of cities, the distribution of wealth, the number 
of citations to a paper, and so on. In these applications the probability of gaining 
a new member, or of increasing revenues, or of receiving a new citation is 
proportional to the number the object already has. The dynamic process is 
reinforcing.
25 According to various researchers we have phenomenon such as 
                                                   
23 In this section we follow Newman’s (2006) survey. 
24 In a Yule process, entities get random increments of a given property in proportion to their present value of 
that property. 
25 See Simon (1955). Recall that the power-law distribution has a “broad dynamic range”. 
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the Matthew effect and the cumulative advantage process, both of which we 
have discussed in previous sections.  
 
4.  ANALYZING THE UPPER END OF THE PERFORMANCE 
DISTRIBUTION: THE ECONOMICS OF "PROLIFICNESS". 
 
Previous studies on prolific (or key) inventors  have focused on firms or 
industries. For example Narin and Breitzman (1995) use four firms in one sector 
in their seminal work.  Pilkington et al. (2009 use two industries. We have 
another perspective: we have  adopted the individual inventor as the unit of 
analysis. We choose to focus our analysis around comparisons of individual 
inventors across countries, across technological fields, and across individuals. 
We use the empirical  results and analysis summarized in the following four 
papers: Gay et al. (2008), Le Bas et al. (2009), Laredo et al. (2009) and Latham 
et al. (2009).  As previously indicated we use a large database on U.S. patenting 
from 1975 to 2002, for  the five largest countries  in terms of scale of 
technological activities: France, Germany, the U.K., the U.S. and Japan. It 
contains more than 55,000 prolific inventors. This database provides systematic 
empirical evidence on the main trends concerning prolific inventors. First we 
summarize some salient stylised facts drawn from our previous studies. Then 
we will provide more details on the explanatory framework we propose for 
“prolificness.” 
4.1. Some stylised facts on “prolificness”. 
(1)  Macro patterns 
(a)  The size of the relative population of prolific inventors as a 
proportion of the total  number of inventors, a first index of 
prolificness, and the number of their patents as the proportion of 
total patenting,  a second index of prolificness, differ across 
countries (see Table 1). Note that there is a strong asymmetry 
between the proportion of prolific inventors and the proportion 
of their patenting. In fact, this asymmetry defines what we term 
“prolificness.”  INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
(b)  The country ranking in terms of “prolificness” according to 
the first index is: Japan, Germany, U.S., France, and the U.K. 
(the U.S. and France change places with the second index). The 
country ranking that we found is coherent (correlated) with 
what we know about the  primary national technological 
indicators  such as  R&D expenditures funded by enterprises, 
triadic patents
26, and private industrial R&D.  
                                                   
26 Triadic patents are those filed in the U.S., Japan and Europe.   16 
(c)  We observe that prolific inventor patenting is distributed 
unevenly across technological fields in all countries.  We also 
observe a close relationship between the degree of a country’s 
technological specialization and the importance of  its prolific 
inventors (measured by their patents as a proportion of all of a 
country’s patents).                           
(d)  The significance of the correlation between technological 
specialization and prolificness is confirmed by a strong 
correlation between the Revealed Technological Advantages 
Index and the proportion of prolific inventor at technological 
subcategory level for 37 subcategories of technology.
27. When 
we regress the RTA and the proportion of prolific inventors at 
the technological field level, we obtain an R
2 of 47.7 %. In an 
expanded model d ummy variables to control for country fix 
effects are not significant and broad technological class fixed 
effects for six categories are significant only for Chemicals. 
This model has an R
2 of 53.3 % (Adjusted R
2  = 50.6 %). The 
slope coefficient for the proportion of prolific inventors  is 
significant at the 1% level. 
(e)  From this last evidence it is possible to provide a tentative 
explanation. The evidence raises the following question: what is 
the relationship between country technological specialization 
and  the  technological importance of prolific inventors 
(measured here by their relative number)? It may be that the 
relationship is simultaneous. On the one hand as more R&D 
investments are made in the fields in which a country is 
specialized, there will be more inventions and consequently the 
more prolific inventors there will be (indirect effects). On the 
other hand, the strengths of each country are reflected in the 
presence of large nationally-based firms (Patel et Pavitt, 1995) 
 
which are able to maintain their specialization persistently in the 
context of competitive pressures if they hire the best 
technological knowledge workers available (prolific inventors). 
Supporting this interpretation,  Pilkington et al. (2009) have 
recently shown that key inventors are primarily located within a 
limited number of key firms  that show  real technological 
leadership ( Pilkington et al., 2009). If this view is correct, we 
would have a “virtuous circle” linking national technological 
                                                   
27 We measure a country’s technological specialisation with an index of revealed technological advantage 
(RTA) as developed and used previously by many authors (see Le Bas and Sierra, 2002). Denoting Pij as the 
number of patents granted in technological field j to country i, the RTA index is calculated on the sample of 
countries used in this study as follows: RTAij = (Pij  / S i P ij) / (S j Pij / S ij S Pij ). When RTAij > 1, technological 
field j is revealed to be a strength for country i.  
   17 
specialisation (countries), technological leadership (firms) and 
highly productive human capital (inventors). Positive feedbacks 
stand at the core of the process and self-reinforcing processes 
are at work here. We find here many of the processes depicted 
by Antonelli  in the introduction to this book,  especially 
irreversibility due to p ath dependence or deterministic p ast 
dependence.  
(2)  Micro patterns  
(a) Almost 30% of our population of prolific inventor got their first 
patent at the outset of the period of time under observation 
(1975). In the U.S. a high proportion of prolific inventors (20%) 
have their first patent after 1990. The variable patent duration (a 
proxy for  the length of an  inventor’s career) differs greatly 
across inventors (and countries). Some inventors are active over 
only 5 years, others are active for more than 35 years. Japanese 
inventors have shorter periods of activity, Germans have longer 
periods. This variable should be used for building a taxonomy 
of inventors: inventors who patent persistently becomes prolific 
overtime, others are prolific quickly (the study should control 
for inter-industrial differences).  
(b) Inventor productivity. Negative binomial regressions explaining 
the inventor productivity  (number of patents)  show that 
interfirm and international mobility and technological variety 
(at the inventor level) positively affect inventor productivity 
after controlling for patent duration and time concentration. The 
overall results suggest that the same factors positively impact 
productivity across countries with few exceptions (Le Bas et al., 
2009). 
(c) Mobility
28. The “dominant design” as far as the effects of 
inventor mobility are concerned is based on knowledge 
spillovers. In standard microeconomics it is acknowledged that 
individual mobility is an important source of knowledge 
externalities (Griliches, 1992; Moen, 2005). Mobility is mainly 
a local phenomenon, in general  knowledge flows between 
economic units are localized to the extent labour mobility also 
is (Breschi and Lissoni, 2003). We present evidence for national 
inter-firm mobility: around 20% of the prolific inventors do not 
move  during the period under observation and  international 
mobility of prolific inventors is very weak (all results shown by 
Le Bas et al., 2009). The mobility equations for the five 
countries (France, Japan, Germany, U -K, USA) show that 
                                                   
28 We envisage here only inter-firm mobility. Latham et al. (2009) deals with geographic mobility and 
technological mobility (intellectual mobility).   18 
productivity is positively associated with mobility. The more 
prolific an inventor is, the more mobile he/she is (in accordance 
with what the recent literature tells us).  
(d) Patent value.  Following Fleming and Szigety (2006) who 
described an evolutionary model of breakthrough invention 
directly linked to prolificness, we thought a priori that the more 
productive a prolific inventor is, the more valuable are his/her 
inventions would be. This follows directly from the idea that the 
most prolific inventor is the one most likely to invent a 
breakthrough. In fact, our findings do not confirm this 
implicaton of creativity. The regressions carried by Latham et 
al. (2009) for three countries (France, Germany, and the U.K.) 
show a consistent negative and significant relationship between 
value and inter-firm mobility. These results are surprising. A 
priori we expected that value would be enhanced by mobility. 
Instead we are left to conclude that while mobility may increase 
patenting, there is more value produced when inventors remain 
where they begin. The negative relationship with productivity 
lends credence to the idea of a trade-off for prolific inventors 
between value and productivity. At this stage of the research we 
have to remain cautious for two reasons: a) we measure value of 
patent by citations and numerous authors have emphasized that 
this measure may be misleading in particular for patents 
receiving high numbers of citations; and b)  so far we have 
studied the relationship between productivity and value only for 
the population of prolific inventors.  When we conduct a 
comparison between prolific and non-prolific inventors, as we 
did in a previous study, the evidence showed clearly that having 
prolific inventors in the team of inventors is a factor increasing 
the number of citations (Gay et al., 2008). 
(3) Micro-Micro patterns. 
(a) Gay et al. (2008) show that prolific inventors work with larger 
teams than others and produce inventions having more value 
after controlling for technological field effects.
29 These results  
suggest that a prolific inventor can act as a “ knowledge system 
integrator.” The “ knowledge system integrator” (the prolific 
inventor) coordinates the competence and capabilities of the 
members  of the  team in order to increase the firms’ 
technological performance and its economic competitiveness. 
This view tends to confirm that human resources are the most 
important factor for R&D performance (and may be for 
                                                   
29 This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that firm size matters as well. Kim, et al. (2004) report that 
inventor productivity is higher in large firms.   19 
scientific research as well), not only because of  the individual 
talents and qualifications of scientists, but also  because of  their 
capacities to create and develop ties with other scientists, the 
scientific “communities” and networks (Laredo et al., 2009). 
(b) Econometric analysis suggests that the presence of a foreign 
inventor (who may or may be not prolific) on the inventive team 
has a positive effect on the value of invention. This witnesses 
the actual importance of the international networks within 
which large, often multinational, corporations operate (Cantwell 
and Iammarino, 2003). Firms extend their knowledge activity 
abroad in order to extract local knowledge for their global 
production of new ideas. 
 
 
4.2. Introductory general remarks on an explanatory framework for 
“prolificness”. 
 
Our empirical findings  to date have  enabled us to  propose  a tentative 
explanatory framework. Our feeling is that there are two fundamental processes 
that explain the prolificness of inventors: First, prolificness is linked to the role 
of these inventors as gatekeepers for “science in the making” (in particular in 
science-based industries). Second, prolificness is linked to the capacity of 
inventors to aggregate resources, mainly human resources, for deploying their 
inventions to the extent that they can be patented (see Laredo et al., 2009), not 
only because of their individual talents and competence, but also because of 
their capacities to create and develop ties with other scientists, the scientific 
"communities" and networks. Their creativity tends to define, to some extent, a 
form of localized technological change (Antonelli, 2008) to the smallest level of 
analysis: an individual.  
 
These general remarks do not even begin to adequately explain the mechanisms 
that determine the precise levels of inventor productivity. Our basic hypothesis 
is that the models laid out in the previous section enable us to account for much 
of the upper end of the tail of the productivity distribution. But they can help us 
only to a limited extent. Both of the two main hypotheses regarding rhw 
productivity of prolific inventors, the "sacred star" and the "accumulative 
advantage" h ypotheses, seem to be at work. We observe in some cases an 
inventor is  immediately prolific. His/her level of patenting is high. In general 
he/she is productive over a short period of time. For  example, the “star 
scientists,” when they patent, enter this category. We can think they have high 
capabilities in their academic and technological fields and stay strongly 
motivated. By contrast, some inventors patent a few patent per year but   20 
persistently over a long time period. They accumulate knowledge step-by-step. 
The "accumulative advantage" hypothesis fits well their career or professional 
trajectory. But at this point of our own research we are not sure that a pattern of 
“increases in productivity inequality” really works. It sets out the limits of the 
comparison between inventors and scientists. A Matthews effect is not observed 
here, or if it  is, only with special insights. Surely an inventor must receive 
financial incentives for researching, inventing, and accumulating knowledge but 
the incentives are not the same kind as the rules governing the awards system in 
science. It may  be  that the Matthews effect works since a good productive 
inventor will receive more money from the firm for developing his/her research 
program. Basically industrial firms are in a competitive environment, they have 
to survive and they search for new technological knowledge, not for the sake of 
increasing the current stock of knowledge but for innovating in a business 
environment (the users part of the knowledge economy). The recognition of the 
inventor is linked to a great extent to his/her capacity to produce new 
knowledge that is economically useful (innovation). The awards come from the 
market, not from the “community of inventors.”  Of course, in  science, the 





The preceding discussion has placed the analysis of prolific inventors at the 
heart of understanding the dynamic complexity of innovation and technological 
change. Our analysis  has been based on only preliminary analyses, ours and 
those of others that have been completed to date. We hope that those analyses 
and our discussion of them now provide guidance in the continuing 
development of empirical research programs on innovative productivity. We 
hope to contribute to the emergence of both  a useful inventor productivity 
taxonomy and a coherent explanatory framework for the observed patterns of 
innovative behaviour.  
 
We believe that the preliminary work suggests some implications for policy and 
management.  Regarding the relations between mobility and productivity, the 
policy implications of our findings are clear but puzzling: more total value will 
be created in R&D if incentives are used to keep inventors where they are. It 
seems that the externality spillover losses from mobility in the firms from which 
inventors move are not offset by the gains in productivity in the firms to which 
inventors move. This is a classic example of private markets not being able to 
adequately balance private individual gains with global losses.    21 
 
Prolific inventors make up a very special variety of human resources that 
require particular management. First, policies and incentives are needed in order 
to both motivate these productive people to share their knowledge and know-
how and simultaneously discourage movements that are not likely to be 
productive or, at least, to discourage them from moving too quickly.
30 Leonard 
and Swap (2005) have described some criteria for the management of “deep 
smarts,” the people who have a high level of expertise in all the areas of the 
industrial life.  It may be useful to apply their analysis to prolific inventors.  
                                                   
30 Inventor mobility must also now be understood as a component of the firm’s overall competitive strategy. 
High tech firms seek completive advantages by actively encouraging defections among their competitors’ 
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Table 1 Prolific Inventors: Number, Indexes of Prolificness, and Average Productivity by Country 
  GB  France  U.S.  Germany  Japan 
Total Number of Prolific Inventors  813  1157  26279  5270  19418 
Index of prolificness (1) 
Number of Prolific Inventors /   Total 











Index of prolificness (2) : 
Number of Prolific Inventors’Patents / 











Average Number of Patents per 
Inventor for  All  Inventors 
2.34  2.38  2.80  3.49  4.94 
Average Number of Patents per 
Inventor for Prolific  Inventors 
24.63  26.34  25.77  30.05  31.14 
Source: Le Bas et al. (2009) 
 
  
 